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Freedom of Speech and Flag Desecration: A
Comparative Study of German, European
and United States Laws*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht, or "BVerfG") decided whether desecration of the German
flag was protected by the constitutional right of freedom of speech, spe-
cifically by artistic freedom.' The European Court of Human Rights in
1988 dedided if three paintings of a Swiss artist were protected by the
right of freedom of speech as granted in Article 10(I) of the European
Human Rights Convention ("MRK").2 In 1989 and 1990, the U.S. Su-
preme Court determined twice, in Texas v. Johnson,- and in U.S. v. Eich-
mann,4 whether it was necessary to limit the First Amendment right of
freedom of speech to protect the American flag and its symbolic value.
This article examines the German, European and American ap-
proaches to freedom of speech. Each subsection discusses the relevant
constitutional provisions and law which applies in the respective jurisdic-
tions. This is followed by an analysis of the leading cases to show how the
law has been interpreted. The fifth section compares the different con-
cepts. Although the laws are similar, the interpretation by the U.S. Su-
preme Court is the most liberal.
II. THE GERMAN APPROACH
A. Freedom of Speech Protected by the German Constitution
(Grundgesetz)
1. Article 5, Paragraph 1
The German Constitution (Grundgesetz, or "GG") of May 23, 1949,
consists of 146 Articles. The procedural and substantive basic rights
(Grundrechte) are enumerated in GG Articles 1 through 19. GG Article
93(I)(4a) specifies basic rights, and GG Article 5 grants the right of free-
dom of expression (Recht der freien Meinungsaeusserung). GG Article
* A table of abbreviations used in this article appears following the text, at page 491.
1. BVerfG, Judgment of March 7, 1990, 1 BvR 266/86, 913/87, 32 N.J.W. 1982 (1990).
2. Joachim Wuerkner, Kunst und Moral - Gedanken zur "Fri-Art 81" - Ent-
scheidung des Europaeisehen Gerichtshofs fuer Menschenrechte, 6 N.J.W. 369 (1989), cit-
ing EGMR (Art. 19, 38 ff. MRK).
3. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
4. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
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5(I) specifically provides: "Everyone shall have the right freely to express
and disseminate his opinion by speech, writing and pictures and freely to
inform himself from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press
and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films are guaran-
teed. There shall be no censorship." 5
GG Article 5(I), then, grants freedom of expression, which includes
freedom of speech, and freedom of information, freedom of the press,
freedom of radio and film, and prohibits censorship. The freedom of ex-
pression broadly granted in GG Article 5(I), in the first half of the first
sentence, however, is strictly limited by GG Article 5(11).
2. Article 5, Paragraph 2
GG Article 5(11) specifies, "These rights are limited by the provisions
of the general laws, the provisions of law for the protection of youth, and
by the right to inviolability of personal honor."6 In Germany, there is no
generic term for a general law or statute. In Germany a statute is not a
general one if it is directed against a specific opinion.7 For example, Sec-
tion 11 of the Statute of October 21, 1878, directed against activities of
Social Democrats, was not considered to be a general statute."
There are, however, exceptions - statutes which are constitutional
without qualifying as general statutes which limit the basic rights pro-
tected by GG Article 5(I)(1) and (2). For example, German Penal Code
(Strafgesetzbuch, or "StGB") § 86(I)(4), Prohibition of Distribution, Pro-
duction and Importing of Goods Used to Propagate Nazi Ideology,9 is di-
rected against a specific opinion; however, these statutes are held consti-
tutional because of the preference of the protection of the free democratic
basic order (Freiheitlich demokratische Grundordnung, or "FDGO") of
Germany. Furthermore, there is no generally applicable statute when the
statute, without aiming at a specific opinion, impacts only on a basic right
named in GG Article 5(I)(1) and (2).1o
The term "general laws" covers regulations based on statutory au-
thorization." The statutory law for the protection of youth must be cre-
ated to protect the young and must be suited to such protection." The
5. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 5 I (F.R.G) [The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of
Germany] (1970), [hereinafter BASIC LAW translation].
6. Id. at art. 5(11).
7. 20 BSGE 178.
8. RGB1 351 (1878).
9. Compare BGH, N.J.W. 1693 (1970); Kohlmann, Verfassungswidrige Parteien fuer
immer mundtot? J.Z. 681 (1971); Greiser, Verbreitung verfassungsfeindlicher Propaganda
(Die Rechtfertigungsgruende des Paragraphen 86 III StGB), N.J.W. 1556 (1972); OLG
Celle MDR 941 (1970).
10. Ridder, Anmerkung zu BVerfG, Beschluss vom 25.01.61 - I BvR 9/57, GG Art 5
II, StGB Paragraph 193, J.Z. 539 (1961); Bettermann, Die allgemeinen Gesetze als
Schranken der Pressefreiheit, J.Z. 604 (1964).
11. OVG Muenster DVB1 509 (1972).
12. 30 BVerfGE 354.
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law of personal honor has the power to limit freedom of speech only so far
as it is statutory law.' 3
3. Article 5, Paragraph 3
GG Article 5(111) states: "Art and science, research and teaching,
shall be free. Freedom of teaching shall not absolve one from loyalty to
the constitution."1 ' This Article grants broad freedom for art and science,
research and teaching. The freedoms granted by this section are not lim-
ited by the provision of GG Article 5(I), which limits the various rights
of freedom of expression as specified in GG Article 5(I). Following the
plain meaning of GG Article 5(111), the freedom of expression in an artis-
tic form arguably could not be touched or sanctioned based on any gen-
eral statute or other statutory law mentioned in GG Article 5(11). There-
fore, if freedom of expression takes an artistic form, it might be
unrestricted.
B. Freedom of Speech Limited by Section 90a, German Penal Code
(Strafgesetzbuch)
A conflict arises if acts exercised under the right of freedom of ex-
pression clash with regulations of the penal code. Section 90(a)(I) of the
German Penal Code (StGB) states:
Whoever publicly, in an assembly, or by disseminating publications or
writings .. .1. insults or maliciously scorns the Federal Republic of
Germany or one of its states, or its constitutional order, or 2. dese-
crates the colors, the flag, the coat of arms or the anthem of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany or one of its states, shall be punished with
imprisonment for up to three years, or shall be fined. 6
Section 90(a) StGB is one of the regulations in the third title of the
German Penal Code, "Endangerment of the Democratic Constitutional
State. '"16 These regulations have been created to focus on endangerment
of interior state security. They are designed not only to protect against
subversive actions, illegal propaganda, and demoralization of the security
institution, but also to prevent the Federal Republic and its institutions
from disparagement.17 The values protected by Section 90(a)(I)(1) StGB
are the existence of the state and the existence of the constitutional order
in the sense of the free democratic basic order (FDGO).' s
13. 33 BVerfGE 17.
14. BASIC LAW translation, supra note 5, at art. 5(111).
15. Author's translation of the German Penal Code § 90(a).
16. Id.
17. Wuertenberger, Kunst, Kunstfreiheit und Staatsverunglimpfung (Paragraph 90a
StGB), J.Z. 309, 311 (1979) (with reference to SCHOENKE-SCHROEDER, STRAFGESETZBUCH,
KOMMENTAR (19th ed. 1978), preface to §§ 80 et seq.).
18. Id. at 311.
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C. Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), March 7, 1990
1. Facts
In 1990, the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) had to
decide the question of whether an illustration on the cover of a book was
protected by the constitutional right of freedom of speech, or more specif-
ically, by the right of artistic freedom, as granted in GG Article 5(III).' 9
In 1981 and 1982, the managing director of a literature distribution
company sold several copies of the book Lasst mich bloss in Frieden
(Leave Me In Peace). The book contained, besides cartoons and collages,
anti-militaristic prose and poetry.
The book's front cover depicted a soldier with a skull and a steel
helmet; the back cover depicted two pictures which formed a collage. The
lower portion of the collage showed a black-and-white picture of an oath
ceremony of the German armed forces in which soldiers held an unfolded
German flag. In the background was a barracks building. In front of that
building, a soldier was standing on a podium which was decorated with a
German flag. Between this soldier and the barracks was a flagpole with a
German flag flying. The sky over the barracks formed the background of
the color-picture, which was the upper half of the collage. The collage
showed a male human torso, wearing a shirt and pants from the knees to
the hips, rising like a giant behind the roof of the barracks. The open fly
was concealed by the man's right hand in urinating position. Behind the
hand, a stream of urine was directed onto the unfolded flag in the lower
picture. Under the flag on the ground, a yellow puddle of urine was
evident.
2. Procedural Posture
The trial court (Amtsgericht) fined the managing director of the
literature distribution company 4500.00 German Marks. The court held
the back cover of the book to be a desecration of the colors and the flag of
the Federal Republic of Germany. 0 The highest appellate court for this
case, the Oberlandesgericht (OLG), dismissed the managing director's
appeal."
Based on his rights granted by Article 93(I)(4)(a),12 the managing di-
rector called on the Federal Constitution Court, claiming that his basic
right of freedom of expression, here the right of artistic freedom, was vio-
19. BVerfG, Judgment of March 7, 1990, 1 BvR 266/86, 913/87, 32 N.J.W. 1982 (1990).
20. Id.
21. OGL Frankfurt 84 NStZ 120.
22. GG art. 93(I)(4)(a) grants everyone the right to call on the Federal Constitutional
Court claiming that his basic rights, as granted by GG arts. 1-19, or one of his rights under
arts. 20(IV), 33, 38, 101, 103 and 104, have been violated by the State. However, all other
possible judicial remedies must be exhausted within the courts of ordinary jurisdiction.
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lated by the criminal prosecution and sentencing.23
3. The Court's Decision
Though the Court held that the appealed decisions violated the di-
rector's constitutional rights, the Court declared that GG Article 5(III)(1)
does not prevent someone from being punished under Section 90(a)(I)(2)
of the German Penal Code (StGB) for desecration of the German flag,
even when used in an artistic form.
24
a. Illustration is Art
The Court held the illustration on the back cover of the book, Lasst
mich bloss in Frieden (Leave Me In Peace), to be art even though the
illustration was offensive. Art is free from State control of style and stan-
dard.2 5 This classification, however, does not prevent punishment under
Section 90(a)(I)(2) StGB for desecration of the German flag, because that
criminal statute was instituted to shield a constitutionally-protected
value.26 In this case, however, the Court held that the necessary weighing
of the conflicting constitutional values had not been done properly and, in
part, an adequate understanding of that specific piece of art had been
lacking.
27
By adding two realistic situations, the author made a certain state-
ment that could and had to be interpreted artistically.2 The fact that the
artist wanted to express a certain opinion with his product did not pre-
clude the protection of GG Article 5(III)(1) because it is the more specific
norm.
29
b. Artistic Freedom Does Not Protect from Punishment
The Court went on to state that, although artistic freedom is granted
unreservedly, it does not generally preclude punishment for violation of
Section 90(a)(I)(2) StGB. The guarantee of GG Article 5(III)(1) is not
only limited by the constitutional rights of third persons, but can also
collide with various constitutional regulations0 because an orderly coexis-
23. The BVerfG decided that case, along with another case (1 BvR 913/87), against an
editor of a journal who had reprinted the back cover of the book, Lasst mich bloss in
Frieden, with the incriminating collage. The editor had been fined 900.00 DM for desecra-
tion of the State and its symbols. The editor's subsequent appeal (Berufung) and his addi-
tional appeal (Revision) had been dismissed. The editor also called on the BVerfG. The
Court did review both cases together and drew the same conclusion. The author focuses here
on the case 1 BvR 266/86 to avoid repetition.
24. BVerfG, Judgment of March 7, 1990, BvR 266/86, 913/87, 32 N.J.W. 1983 (1990).
25. Id. (with reference to 75 BVerfGE 369, 377).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. (with reference to 30 BVerfGE 173, 189).
29. Id. (with reference to 30 BVerfGE 173, 200 and 75 BVerfGE 369, 377).
30. Id. (with reference to 30 BVerfGE 173, 193 and Lerche, Schranken der Kunst-
freiheit - Insbesondere zu offenen Fragen der Mephisto-Entscheidung, BayVBI. 177, 180-
181 (1974)).
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tence of the people requires not only mutual consideration of everyone,
but also a functioning public State order which secures the efficiency of
the protection of constitutional rights.-
Works of art which undermine the constitutionally-granted order are
not limited only if they endanger the existence of the State or the Consti-
tution. When other constitutional values are in conflict with expression
under artistic freedom, there must be a balance between the contradic-
tory, equally constitutionally-protected interests.3 '
c. The Conflicting Constitutional Values
The Court held that artistic freedom was in conflict with the protec-
tion of the symbols of the State. Section 90(a)(I)(2) StGB protects the
German flag as a State symbol. GG Article 22 expressly determines the
colors of the German flag only, but presupposes the right of the State to
present itself in symbols. The purpose of these symbols is to appeal to the
State consciousness of its citizens.
3 2
Germany, as a free State, is dependent on its citizens' identification
with the basic values symbolized by the flag. These protected values are
symbolized by the colors prescribed in GG Article 22. The colors re-
present the free, democratic basic order (FDGO). If the flag serves as an
important medium of cohesion, the desecration of the flag can undermine
the State's authority which is necessary for the State's internal peace.
This means that State symbols are protected by the constitution only in-
sofar as they symbolize what is fundamental for Germany.33
Focusing on GG Article 5(III)(1), however, the protection of the
State's symbols is not allowed to immunize the State against criticism
and even rejection. It is necessary, therefore, in each case to weigh the
contradictory constitutional values.34 In this case, the Court concluded
that the decision against the managing director did not meet these consti-
tutional requirements and held the judgment against him as a violation of
his constitutional rights.3 5
The Court held that the Appellate Court (OLG) did not treat the
collage correctly. Since it is typical for artists to exaggerate and distort, it
is necessary to look beyond the satirical words and pictures to determine
the collage's real content.3 6 The Court held that the Appellate Court mis-
interpreted the real content of the collage, holding the real content to be
31. Id. (with reference to 77 BVerfGE 240, 253).




35. Id. In another decision on the same day, the Federal Constitutional Court held
that GG Article 5(III)(1) does not generally preclude punishment under Section 90(a)(I)(2)
StGB for desecration of the German national anthem, BVerfG, Beschluss from March 7,
1990, 1 BvR 1215/87, 32 N.J.W. 1985 (1990).
36. Id. at 1984 (with reference to 62 RGSt 183, 75 BVerfGE 369, 377).
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the desecration of the flag and the State, which is symbolized by the flag.
The Court found, however, that although the collage shows a State sym-
bol's defamation, it was not intended to attack the state or the demo-
cratic basic order of the Federal Republic of Germany. Instead, the criti-
cism was directed mainly against militarism in Germany, and the State
was attacked only because it was enforcing the military draft and legiti-
mizing the draft by using the State's symbols at the oath ceremony." The
Court concluded that because more freedom is given to the satirical dis-
tortion than to its content, the OLG's misinterpretation of the collage
caused a violation of the constitution.38
Though in this particular case the Court found that the acts were
constitutionally protected, the judges held that freedom of expression as
granted in GG Article 5(111) does not generally preclude punishment
under Section 90(a)(I)(2) StGB. 9
4. Consequences of the Court's Opinion
The Court's decision was severely criticized in Germany, especially
the determination by the Court of which values were constitutionally pro-
tected so that they could be used to limit the freedom of expression as
granted by GG Article 5(111), though the constitution should determine
these protected values. 0 The German flag was mentioned in GG Article
22, but not expressly protected.
4 1
The deciding term "desecration" in the German Penal Code as used
in Section 90(a) StGB was held by critics as unclear, 2 and not inter-
preted by any of the various courts which were involved in the flag dese-
cration case. Therefore, the Court's decision of March 7, 1990, was held to
be more sibyllinic than solomonian.43
It seems dangerous when the rule allowing freedom of expression as
granted in GG Article 5(111), to be limited by "constitutionally-protected
values" only, is annulled by the Federal Constitutional Court by valuing




39. Id. at 1983.
40. Christoph Gusy, Anmerkung zu BVerfG, Beschluss v. 7.3.1990 -1 BvR 266/86 und
913/87, J.Z. 640, 641 (1990) (with reference to CHRISTOPH Gusy, PARLAMENTARISCHER
GESETZGEBER UND BVERFG 65 (1985)).
41. Id.
42. Id. (with reference to BEMMANN AND MANOLEDAKIS, DER STRAFRECHTLICHE SCHUTZ
DES STAATES 107 (1987)).
43. Gusy, supra note 40, at 641.
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III. THE EUROPEAN APPROACH
A. Freedom of Speech Protected by the European Convention on
Human Rights
Freedom of speech is protected in Western Europe not only by the
national laws of the European nations, but also by the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (MRK),44 which has been ratified by twenty-one
western European nations.4
By accession to the Convention, the nations guarantee their citizens
and residents the Convention's rights and freedoms."6
Freedom of speech is granted by MRK Article 10(I)."' Freedom of speech
under the Convention consists of freedom of forming an opinion, freedom
to express an opinion, and freedom to receive information."8
When a right or freedom granted by the Convention is violated, the
encumbered person or legal entity is entitled to call upon the European
Commission of Human Rights ("Commission") for a decision. The Com-
mission was formed by the contracting States under Article 19 (a) of the
MRK. The Commission is entitled to accept a matter only after exhaus-
tion of all intra-state legal remedies of an encumbered party. 9
If the Commission concludes that the named state violated its obliga-
tions under the Convention, and mediation by the commissioner, as pre-
44. Several nations have made reservations and declarations regarding specific provi-
sions of the Convention at the time of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession to the
Convention.
45. The ratifying nations include the twelve member countries of the European Com-
munity: Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. The other Con-
tracting States to the MRK are: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway, Austria, Sweden,
Switzerland, San Marino, Turkey and Cyprus.
46. MRK art. 1.
47. Article 10 of the Convention states:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall in-
clude freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and re-
sponsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder' or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and im-
partiality of the judiciary.
MRK art. 10.
48. FROWEIN AND FROWEIN-PEUKERT, EUROPAEISCHE MENSCHENRECHTS-KONVENTON,
art. 10 n. 2.
49. MRK art. 26.
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scribed by MRK Article 28, fails, the Commission calls for a decision by
the European Court of Human Rights." The decision of the European
Court of Human Rights is final, and the Contracting States are obligated
to obey the Court's decision. 1
B. The Case of Josef Felix Mueller
1. Facts
In 1988, the European Court of Human Rights decided the question
of whether the exhibition of three paintings of the Swiss artist, Josef Fe-
lix Mueller, which were exhibited in the city of Fribourg in Switzerland,
were protected by the right of freedom of speech as granted in Article 10
I of the European Convention on Human Rights.
In the fall of 1988, the artist created three monumental paintings en-
titled Drei Naechte, drei Bilder (Three Nights, Three Paintings) at the
art exhibition "Fri-Art 81" in Fribourg. The local authorities in Fribourg
decided that the paintings emphasized extreme forms of sexuality and
confiscated the paintings. The authorities believed the paintings severely




Although the Swiss Constitution of May 29, 1874,52 does not contain
an explicit, fundamental right of freedom of speech in an artistic form,
the Swiss Federal Court in 1962 extended freedom of speech as an un-
written, fundamental right of the Swiss Federal Constitution with respect
to the creation of art. 3
Twenty years later, however, a criminal court in Zurich54 sentenced
50. The European Commission of Human Rights was established by the Contracting
States under MRK art. 19(b). The European Court of Human Rights is the second Euro-
pean Court. The European Court of Justice, established under Article 4 of the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome, 1957), insures uniformity in the inter-
pretation and application of the Community law. Treaty of Rome art. 164. The Court of
Justice does not have jurisdiction regarding the acts of states which are not members of the
European Community but are Contracting States of the European Convention on Human
Rights. The European Court of Human Rights is seen by some jurists as the future Euro-
pean.Constitutional Court; see, e.g., WEIDMANN, DER EUROPAEISCHE GERICHTSHOF FUER MEN-
SCHENRECHTE AUF DEM WEG ZU EINEM EUROPAEISCHEN VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSHOF (1985). See
also Lang, The Development of European Community Constitutional Law, 25 INT'L LAW.
455 (1991).
51. MRK art. 52.
52. Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft.
53. Judgment of September 19, 1962 of the Swiss Federal Court (Schweizer
Bundesgericht), 64 ZBI 363, 365 (1963).
54. Obergericht Zuerich.
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Harald Naegeli, "the Sprayer of Zurich," to nine months imprisonment
and a fine of 100,000 Swiss Francs. From 1977 to 1979, Harald Naegeli
secretly sprayed figures on hundreds of public and private buildings in
the city of Zurich. The figures had a distinctive style and were held by
various Swiss art critics to be an important form of art. After his arrest,
Naegeli stated that he believed his figures were an artistic message to
society." Naegeli was found guilty of repeated property damage6 under
Article 145(I) of the Swiss Penal Code.
5 7
b. Application to Mueller
Josef Felix Mueller was prosecuted under a provision of the Swiss
Penal Code5" which outlaws obscene publications. He was convicted by
the Court of First Instance Saanen.5 9 Mueller appealed to the Appellate
Court Fribourg ° without success and brought another appeal to the Swiss
Federal Court." The Swiss Federal Court dismissed the appeal, and the
artist filed a suit in the European Court of Human Rights against Swit-
zerland for violation of his right of freedom of speech as granted by Arti-
cle 10 I MRK.
3. Holding of the European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights relied in its decision in the
matter of Mueller on its previous opinion in the Handyside Case.2 The
Commission, in its report under MRK Article 31, declared the expression
of artistic freedom as of fundamental importance in a democratic society.
By means of his creative work, the artist not only expresses his personal
view of life, but also his thoughts about the society in which he lives.
Artistic expression not only furthers education, but also furthers expres-
sion of public opinion. Furthermore, the artistic presentation may initiate
a public discussion of the important issues of the time. 3
In the Handyside Case, the European Court of Human Rights had to
decide whether authorities of the United Kingdom had exceeded their
discretion in seizing the alleged obscene publication entitled "The Little
55. Hoffman, N.J.W. 237 (1985); M. MUELLER, DER SPRAYER VON ZUERICH,
SOLIDARITAET MIT HARALD NAEGELI (1984). Harald Naegeli appealed the decision of the
Swiss Federal Court to the European Court of Human Rights, but the Commission dis-
missed the case. The reasoning of the Commission was that freedom of speech in an artistic
form does not extend to the damage of others' personal property for the purpose of expres-
sion of artistic freedom. N.J.W. 2753 (1984); EuGRZ 259, 260 (1984); P.C. RAGAZ, DIE
MEINUNGSAEUSSERUNGSFREIHEIT IN DER MENSCHENRECHTSKONVENTION (1979).
56. Sachbeschaedigung.
57. Swiss STGB (Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch).




62. Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment of December 7, 1976.
63. Wuerkner, Kunst und Moral-Gedanken zur "Fri-Art-81": Entscheidung des
Europaeischen Gerichtshof fuer Menschenrechte, N.J.W. 369, 371 (1989).
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Red Schoolbook" and in prosecuting its publisher, Richard Handyside,
under the 1959-1964 Obscene Publications Act which resulted in his con-
viction and seizure and confiscation of the book.
6 4
The Court observed that it was not possible to find, in the domestic
law of the various Contracting States to the European Convention on
Human Rights, a uniform European concept of morals.6 5 Countries' re-
spective laws of the requirements of morals vary in time and place, espe-
cially in modern times which are characterized by a rapid and far-reach-
ing evolution of opinions. According to the Court, by reason of their
direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, na-
tional authorities are in a better position than international judges to give
an opinion on the exact content of these requirements, as well as on the
"necessity" of a "restriction" or "penalty" intended to meet these re-
quirements.6" National authorities must make the initial assessment of
the realities of the pressing social need implied by the notion of "neces-
sity" in this context. Consequently, MRK Article 10(11) leaves the Con-
tracting States a margin of appreciation.
6 7
The Court further observed that it is not its task to replace compe-
tent national courts, but rather to review under MRK Article 10 decisions
delivered in exercise of the courts' power of appreciation. However, the
European Court's supervision would generally prove illusory if it did no
more than examine these decisions in isolation; it must view them in light
of the case as a whole, including the alleged obscene publication in ques-
tion and the arguments and evidence adduced by the applicant in the
domestic legal system, and then decide, on the basis of the different data
available to it, whether the reasons given by the national authorities to
justify the actual measures of "interference" taken are relevant and suffi-
cient under MRK Article 10(II).8
In the Handyside Case, the Court held that freedom of speech is a
cornerstone of a democratic society, an important condition for its pro-
gress and for individual self-realization."6 The Court emphasized that
freedom of speech applies to inconvenient views, to views that provoke,
shock or bother the State or a part of the population.
70
In the case of Josef Felix Mueller, the Court followed its opinion in
the Handyside Case. The Court extended freedom of expression under
MRK Article 10(I) to artistic expression of opinions, including those
opinions which provoke, shock or disturb. Pluralism, tolerance and liber-
ality are necessary for a democratic society: "Those who create, interpret,
64. Eur. Ct. H.R., EuGRZ 38, 42 (1976).




69. Eur. Ct. H.R., EuGRZ 38, 42 (1976); see also BERGER, RECHTSPRECHUNG DES
EUROPAEISCHEN GERICHTSHOF FUER MENSCHENRECHTE 79 (1987).
70. Eur. Ct. H.R., EuGRZ 38, 42 (1976).
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distribute or exhibit works of art contribute to the exchange of ideas and
opinions which is essential for a democratic society. Hence, the obligation
on the State not to encroach unduly on their freedom of expression."7 '
The Court focused on the limitations of freedom of expression as
provided for in MRK Article 10(II), holding that Mueller's criminal con-
victions under the Swiss Penal Code were "prescribed by law"7 and were
necessary "for the protection of morals and the rights of others."""
The Court had to decide the question of whether or not the restric-
tion of the right granted by MRK Article 10(I) was "necessary in a demo-
cratic society."7' In answer, the Court held that artists and others who
support the artist's work are limited by the restrictions of MRK Article
10(II): whoever exercises these freedoms carries duties and responsibili-
ties. The reach of these duties and responsibilities depends on the artist's
situation and the media he used. The Court held that it had to review the
duties and responsibilities in order to answer the question of whether or
not a conviction was necessary in a democratic society."
The Court then weighed individual artistic freedom against the pro-
tection of morals.76 The Court stated that in 1988, it was still impossible
to find a common European view of morals in the social and legal order of
the Contracting States to the European Convention on Human Rights.
Therefore, the public authorities are generally, by means of their direct
and continuous contact with their countries' people, better equipped to
judge the specific meaning of the duties and responsibilities, and also to
judge the necessity to restrict the exercise of the freedoms and to decide
on a penalty to obtain the restriction.
77
The Court thereby granted the Contracting States wide discretion in
judging the necessity of restricting the right of freedom of expression.
The Court concluded that Josef Felix Mueller's conviction was necessary
for the protection of morals of the Swiss population and other visitors to
the exhibition.
78
C. Freedom of Speech Protection in States which Adopted the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights Compared with German Intra-State
Protection
The European Court of Human Rights focused in Mueller's case on
the criteria of duties and responsibilities as provided for in MRK Article
10(II). However, it may be a heavy burden on the artist to think about his
71. Eur. Ct. H.R., EuGRZ 543, 545 (1988); N.J.W. 379 (1989).
72. MRK art. 10 II, criterion 1.
73. Id. at criterion 2.
74. Id. at criterion 3.






duties and responsibilities while he is creating a piece of art. The Court
was criticized for infringing upon the creativity of artists.""
The German Federal Constitutional Court has a different approach
in reviewing the limitation of artistic freedom, acknowledging in its deci-
sions that there are peculiarities in the field of art which have to be con-
sidered when the courts review the limits of freedom of expression in the
arts.80 For example, in its so-called "Cartoon Decision" in 1977,81 the Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court had to decide whether or not a cartoon
published in a magazine, which showed a high-ranking German politician
as a copulating pig, was protected by the constitutional right of freedom
of expression under Article 5 of the German Constitution.8 2 The artist
was fined for defamation 83 by a criminal court of first instance.
The Federal Constitutional Court held the cartoons to be art as
stated in GG Article 5(111)."8 Though the Court found it impossible to
generally define what art is, it held it necessary to differentiate between
what constitutes art and what does not, and define the basic requirements
for a work to be considered art in applying GG Article 5(III)."s A differen-
tiation between higher and lower, or better or worse, art was held not to
be allowed by the Court. Such a differentiation would be considered an
illegal censorship of the content.88
The Court considered the cartoons to be the product of a free, crea-
tive process in which the artist expressed his views, impressions and ex-
periences. 87 The Court, therefore, held that the cartoon met the require-
ments essential for artistic activity.88
The fact that the artist expresses a certain opinion with the cartoons
does not change the fact that the cartoons are art.88 The Court further
held that art, and the expression of an opinion, are not mutually exclu-
sive; an opinion could - as is normally a fact in art with a political theme
- be expressed as art.90 The Court viewed GG Article 5(III)(1) to be the
governing basic right.
Though the Court held the cartoons to be art, it found that the per-
sonal rights of the politician, who was the subject of the cartoons, out-
79. Wuerkner, supra note 63.
80. 30 BVerfGE 173, 191.
81. Karikatur-Beschluss.
82. 75 BVerfGE 369.
83. StGB § 185.
84. Wuerkner, supra note 63, at 377.
85. Id.
86. Id. (with reference to SCHOLZ, MAUNZ, DUERIG, GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR, n. 39
(1983); GG art, 5(111)).
87. Id.
88. Id. (with reference to 67 BVerfGE 213, 226 and 30 BVerfGE 173, 200).
89. Id.
90. Id. (with reference to SCHOLZ, MAUNZ, DUERIG, GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR, n.13
(1983); GG art. 5(111)).
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weighed the artist's freedom of expression. 1 Even though exaggerations
were typical for cartoons, and were directed toward a public figure, the
cartoons were not protected by artistic freedom.92 The Court found that
the cartoons were directed against the personal honor of the politician,
which is protected by GG Article 1(I)." The German Federal Constitu-
tional Court held in previous cases that if someone's personal honor is
impaired, there is a severe injury to his personal rights. The commission
of this injury is not protected by artistic freedom.1
4
In its "Cartoon Decision," and also in its "Anachronistic March Deci-
sion,"95 the German Federal Constitutional Court respected the arts' pe-
culiarities and considered them in its decision process. The Court does
not take recourse, as does the European Court of Human Rights, to the
duties and responsibilities of the artist while he is in the process of being
creative, and thereby grants the artist a greater amount of freedom in the
creative process.
IV. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH
A. Freedom of Speech Protected by the First Amendment of the
Constitution
Freedom of speech in the United States of America is protected by
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 6 Though the
First Amendment literally forbids the abridging of freedom of "speech,"
the United States Supreme Court has long recognized that its protection
does not end with the spoken or written word, and that it also includes
conduct."'
B. The Case of Texas v. Johnson
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide, in the case of Texas
v. Johnson,s whether it was necessary, in order to protect the American
flag and its symbolic value, to limit the First Amendment right to free-
dom of speech. After publicly burning an American flag as a means of
political protest, Gregory Lee Johnson was convicted of desecrating a flag
in violation of the Texas Penal Code.9 After a trial, Johnson was con-
91. Id. at 379.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 380 (with reference to 67 BVerfGE 213, 228).
95. ANACHRONISTISCHER ZUG (1980), 67 BVerfGE 213, 224.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government
for redress of grievances."
97. See e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
98. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
99. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09, Desecration of Venerated Object (1989) provides:
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victed and sentenced to one year in prison and fined U.S. $2000.00. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed Johnson's con-
viction, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that
the State could not, consistent with the First Amendment, punish John-
son for burning the flag in those specific circumstances.
Johnson participated in a political demonstration held in Dallas in
1984, during the Republican National Convention, against the policies of
the Reagan Administration. At the end of the demonstration, in front of
the Dallas city hall, Johnson burned an American flag. He was convicted
of desecrating a flag by burning it rather than for uttering insulting
words. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Johnson's burning of the flag
constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First
Amendment. 100
The next question the Supreme Court had to answer was whether the
State's regulation was related to the suppression of free expression."'
The Court answered affirmatively, and then used a high standard of scru-
tiny to decide whether the State's interest justified Johnson's convic-
tion.102 The Court found that Johnson's burning of the flag was conduct
"sufficiently imbued with elements of communication" to implicate the
First Amendment.0 3 Johnson's burning of the flag as part of the political
demonstration that coincided with the convening of the Republican Party
and its renomination of Ronald Reagan for President was held by the
Court to be of an expressive, overtly political nature.'" The Court stated
that while the government may regulate such expressive conduct, the reg-
ulation must be for reasons separate from the content of such conduct.
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, 'desecrate' means deface, damage, or otherwise
physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or
more persons likely to observe or discover his action.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
100. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
101. Id. The Court, in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), held that if State
regulation is not related to expression, then the less stringent standard for regulation of
non-communicative conduct should be applied. In this case, the Court had to decide first
whether draft card burning during the Vietnam War protests was protected as speech by the
First Amendment. In O'Brien, the Court held that when speech and non-speech are com-
bined in conduct, an incidental restriction of expression resulting from regulating the non-
speech element could be justified only if the following conditions were satisfied: (1) the regu-
lation furthered an important or substantial governmental interest; (2) the government in-
terest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (3) the incidental restriction
on freedom was no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id.
102. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412. The Court held that, although Johnson had raised a
facial challenge to Texas' flag-desecration statute, it chose to resolve the case on the basis of
Johnson's claim that the statute, as applied to him, violated the First Amendment. Id.
103. Id. at 406.
104. Id.
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Here the State offered two rationales. First, the restriction was in-
tended to prevent breaches of the peace. This rationale was held insuffi-
cient, for it did not automatically follow that conduct such as that in
which Johnson engaged leads to breaches of the peace. In the case at
hand, in the demonstration in question, no violence erupted." Second,
the regulation would preserve the flag as a symbol of nationhood and na-
tional unity. The Court held that the interest of the State in preserving
the special symbolic character of the flag by restriction on Johnson's ex-
pression was content-based so that "the most exacting scrutiny" had to
be applied. 108
The Court then confirmed its principle view: "If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable. ' 10 7 The Court did not recognize an
exception to that principle, even where the American flag was involved."08
With reference to Schacht,' the Court emphasized that it had never
held that the government may demand that a symbol be used to express
only one view of that symbol or its referents. "' In Schacht v. United
States, the Court invalidated a federal statute permitting an actor por-
traying a member of one of the U.S. armed forces to "wear the uniform of
that armed force if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed
force." That proviso, the Court held, "which leaves Americans free to
praise the war in Vietnam but can send persons like Schacht to prison for
opposing it cannot survive in a country which has the First
Amendment.""'
Comparing the U.S. flag with the Presidential Seal or the Constitu-
tion, the Court held that there was no indication - either in the text of
the Constitution or in opinions interpreting the Constitution - that a
separate juridical category existed for the American flag alone." 2 The
Court said it was not the state's ends but the means to which it objected.
The Court recognized that the government had a legitimate interest in




108. Id., citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). In Street, the Court held that
a state may not criminally punish a person for uttering words critical of the flag. Rejecting
the argument that the conviction "could be sustained on the ground that the accused had
failed to show the respect for our national symbol which may properly be demanded of
every citizen," the Court concluded that "the constitutionally guaranteed freedom to be in-
tellectually ... diverse, or even contrary, and the right to differ as to things that touch the
heart of the existing order encompass the freedom to express publicly one's opinions about
our flag, including those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous." Id.
109. 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
110. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 417.




but held that this interest did not justify criminal punishment of a person
for burning a flag as a means of political protest."'
The Court viewed its decision in Johnson as a reaffirmation of the
principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflected, and of
the conviction that the American people's tolerance of criticism such as
Johnson's was a sign and source of its strength. The Court saw that it is
the nation's resilience, not its rigidity, that is reflected in the flag, and it
was that resilience that the Court wanted to reassert.'
1 4
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the Ameri-
can flag enjoys a unique position as a national symbol, and from that it
derived a special class of deserved protection.'" Chief Justice Rehnquist
considered Johnson to have been free to make any verbal denunciation of
the flag that he wished, that Johnson had been free to burn the flag in
private, or could have burned other symbols of the government." 6
To penalize flag burning if the actor knows that it will seriously of-
fend other persons who observe or discover his action" 7 was viewed by
the Chief Justice as justified because it deprived the actor of only one
"rather inarticulate symbolic form of protest," and left him many other
symbols and every form of verbal expression by which to express his dis-
approval of national policy."' Chief Justice Rehnquist held that Johnson
was punished for his use of the flag, and not for the idea he sought to
convey by burning it."9
C. The Case of U.S. v. Eichmann
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide again whether the
protection of the American flag and its symbolic value entitles the legisla-
ture to limit the constitutional right of freedom of speech as granted by
the First Amendment.
20
While the Court in Johnson'2' held a provision of the Texas Penal
Code to be incompatible with the Constitutionally granted right of free-
dom of speech, the Court had to review in Eichmann the question of
whether a federal statute, the Flag Protection Act of 1989,122 was consis-
tent with the First Amendment.




116. Id. at 418.
117. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (1989).
118. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 432.
119. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist viewed it as one of the high purposes of a democratic
society to legislate against conduct that is regarded as evil and profoundly offensive to the
majority of people - whether it be murder or flag-burning. Id. at 435.
120. U.S. v. Eichmann, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
121. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 1990).
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Court's opinion in Texas v. Johnson.128 The Flag Protection Act of 1989
criminalized the conduct of anyone who "knowingly mutilates, defaces,
physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground or tramples
upon" a United States flag, except conduct related to the disposal of a
"worn or soiled flag."
Based on the Flag Protection Act of 1989, several demonstrators who
publicly burned the American flag to protest the politics of the Reagan
administration or, in some cases, burned the flag to protest the Flag Pro-
tection Act of 1989, were indicted in several states. In every case, the U.S.
District Courts dismissed the charges with respect to the decision of the
Supreme Court in Johnson, and held the Flag Protection Act to be in
violation of the First Amendment.
The appeals were consolidated and dismissed by a majority of five
Justices. The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed its holding in Johnson and
referred to that opinion.11 The Court considered it important that the
Flag Protection Act of 1989 was aimed at the limitation of freedom of
speech by penalizing the desecration of the flag by burning it or by other
means of physical mistreatment.12 5
Congress had chosen a neutral wording of the statute by penalizing
every intentional desecration of the flag, while the Texas Penal Code 26 in
Johnson penalized a person only for desecration of the flag if the actor
knew it would seriously offend other persons.
However, the Court in U.S. v. Eichmann2 7 held that, though the
plain meaning of the Federal statute neither mentioned the actor's mo-
tives nor the effect of his act on third persons, the Flag Protection Act of
1989 was aimed at penalizing only such acts of flag desecration which
were used by an actor to express publicly an opinion that was directed
against the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity. Therefore,
the Court continued, an indictment and conviction under the Flag Pro-
tection Act of 1989 constituted a direct violation of freedom of speech as
granted by the First Amendment. When there is direct restriction of ex-
pression, the State's asserted interest in preserving the special symbolic
character of the flag must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny. The
Court held that the First Amendment's freedom to express even opinions
rejected by the majority of the people has preference over the State's in-
123. Immediately after the decision in the flag-burning case (Texas v. Johnson) was
announced, President Bush responded to the decision by announcing that he would seek a
Constitutional amendment to prohibit the burning of the American flag. He added, "Protec-
tion of the flag, a unique national symbol, will in no way limit the opportunity nor the
breadth of protest available in the exercise of free speech rights." Bipartisan Congressional
support greeted the proposal; public opinion polls indicated that the Johnson decision was
very unpopular. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 93
(3d ed. Supp. 1989).
124. Eichmann, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
125. Id. at 314.
126. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09.
127. Eichmann, 496 U.S. at 314.
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terest in protecting symbols as the State's media of identification and in-
tegration. Therefore, the Court held that the Flag Protection Act of 1989
violated the Constitutional right to freedom of speech, even though a ma-
jority of the people was in favor of penalizing flag burning.2 8
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens objected, stating that the
First Amendment does not grant absolute protection to any kind of ex-
pression. The Constitutional protection of freedom of speech does not im-
munize any attack on Constitutional values and symbols. The flag, as a
national symbol, has to be protected from destruction and desecration,
even though those acts are done to express a certain opinion. 2 9
V. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GERMAN, EUROPEAN
AND UNITED STATES APPROACHES
The German and the U.S. Constitutions both contain provisions that
grant freedom of speech. While the plain meaning of the U.S. Constitu-
tion seems to grant unlimited freedom of speech, the Article of the Ger-
man Constitution that grants freedom of speech"'0 itself describes the
borders of that freedom. However, artistic freedom, as provided in Article
5(111) of the German Constitution is not limited by the language of the
Article granting freedom of speech.
In the U.S., the limits to freedom of speech are determined by the
highest U.S. court, the Supreme Court; the highest German court, the
Federal Constitutional Court, 13 ' also determines the extent of freedom of
speech. The reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional Court's deci-
sion of March 7, 1990, is close to the reasoning of the dissenting opinions
in Texas v. Johnson"2 and U.S. v. Eichmann13 3
The European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Mueller, had to
interpret the freedom of speech as granted in the Convention. This Arti-
cle bestows freedom of speech within the limits of the "duties and respon-
sibilities it carries with it,"1 134 so that by its plain meaning there is a limi-
tation. The duties and responsibilities have to be determined by each
Contracting State to the European Convention on Human Rights. There
is wide room for discretion on the part of national authorities of the Con-
tracting States in limiting the freedom of speech as granted by the Con-
vention by means of national penal statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
Freedom 9f speech as granted in the European Convention on
128. Id. at 315.
129. Id. at 316.
130. GG art. 5.
131. Bundesverfassungsgericht.
132. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
133. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
134. MRK art. 10(11).
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Human Rights and as interpreted by the European Court of Human
Rights has the lowest level of protection in comparison to Germany and
the United States of America. Although several of the Contracting States
to the European Convention on Human Rights are not currently mem-
bers of the European Community, they are all prospective members. The
European Convention on Human Rights may one day become part of a
constitution of the European Community. Under that scenario the provi-
sions protecting freedom of speech should, in order to offer the most ef-
fective protection, be revised and approximated to the provisions in the
German or U.S. constitutions.
The decision process and the results of the U.S. Supreme Court's de-
cisions in the area of freedom of speech seem to be more liberal than the
practice of the German Federal Constitutional Court. The decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court tend to come closer to the real meaning of free-
dom of speech as granted by the Constitutions of both States.
Comprehensive education and training of German Federal Constitu-
tional Court judges in comparative law may have prevented the German
Court from holding, in the case decided on March 7, 1990, that freedom
of speech as granted by the German Constitution in GG Article 5(111)
does not generally preclude punishment under the German Penal Code.
The German courts are upholding their rather restrictive view. In Oc-
tober, 1991, the Court of First Instance'3 5 in Munich fined Volker A.
Zahn, author of an article published in the German news magazine Wie-
ner, and Wolfgang Maier, its publisher, DM 2000 and DM 7000 respec-
tively for publishing an article in the magazine. The four page long arti-
cle's headline was "Bavaria: The Madhouse of the Republic" (Bayern:
Das Irrenhaus der Republik), and its subheadline was "My Ass is
Licked" (Mi leckst am Oarsch).
The journalist and publisher were prosecuted for, and convicted of, a
violation of Section 90(a)(I)(1) of the German Penal Code for insulting,
and maliciously scorning the Federal State of Bavaria by means of the
article. 3 ' Judge Dieter Schoepf held that the publisher and author dese-
crated the State of Bavaria by calling it "the madhouse of the Republic"
and by equating it with the former State of East Germany.
1 37
It will be of great interest to review the outcome of appeals to this
decision if they reach the German Federal Constitutional Court, or even
the European Court of Human Rights.
Bernhard Jiirgen Bleise
135. Amtsgericht Muenchen.
136. Compare Chapter III(B)(6) regarding StGB § 90(a).
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